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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 02-1656
                    
VERNOL STEWART,
                                      Appellant
v.
ROY L. HENDRICKS, SUPERINTENDENT,
NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON; JOHN J.
FARMER, JR., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-05207
District Judge:  The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 17, 2003
                    
Before: McKEE, BARRY, and WEIS, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed: July 18, 2003)
                    
OPINION
                    
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
On September 27, 1993, after a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
appellant Vernol Stewart was convicted of first degree murder, possession of a handgun
without a permit, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and was sentenced
to thirty years incarceration without the possibility of parole.  He now appeals from the
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d).  For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate the District Court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
Stewart filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, which affirmed his conviction on January 9, 1996.  On March 26, 1996, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey denied his Petition for Certification. State v. Stewart, 144
N.J. 175, 675 A.2d 1123 (N.J. 1996) (table).  Having exhausted his direct appeals, on March
21, 1997, Stewart filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the Superior Court, which
was denied on July 31, 1997.  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial, and on October
26, 1999, the Supreme Court denied Stewart’s Petition for Certification.  State v. Stewart,
162 N.J. 199, 743 A.2d 851 (N.J. 1999) (table).
On September 26, 2000, Stewart filed the instant habeas petition pro se, pursuant
3to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging (1) that his trial and appellate counsel had rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) errors by the
trial court in instructing the jury.  On April 25, 2001, the District Court ordered
respondents to file an answer to the petition, and, on June 28, 2001, they filed a 39-page
answer which addressed Stewart’s petition on the merits, but did not raise, much less raise
as an issue, the applicable statutory limitations period.  Stewart filed a pro se traverse
responding to the answer on July 31, 2001.
Six months later, on January 23, 2002, the District Court dismissed Stewart’s
petition because it had not been filed within the one-year limitations period prescribed by
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  The District Court found that section 2244(d)’s one-year period for
filing a habeas petition began to run for Stewart on April 23, 1996, the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the beginning of the one-
year grace period for claims arising prior to that date.  The District Court concluded that,
even after tolling the one-year limitations period for the time that Stewart’s petition for
post-conviction relief was pending before the state courts, the limitations period had run
on November 30, 1999, ten months before Stewart filed his habeas petition.  The District
Court’s dismissal of that petition was based solely on its conclusion that it was thus time-
barred, and did not address any other procedural issues or the merits of the petition or
respondents’ answer.
On February 28, 2002, Stewart filed a notice of appeal with this Court, and on
4March 15, 2002, we remanded the matter to the District Court with instructions to either
issue a certificate of appealability or to state why such a certificate should not issue.  On
March 18, 2002, the District Court issued an order which stated that Stewart was not
entitled to a certificate of appealability because he had not made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right, and for the reasons it had set forth in its January 23,
2002 order dismissing the petition.
On November 29, 2002, we issued an order treating Stewart’s notice of appeal as a
request for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), and granted
the request as to the following question: “Whether the district court erred by sua sponte
dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time barred by the one year
period of limitation prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), where the respondents did not
assert the affirmative defense in their answer to the petition.”
II.
In our recent en banc decision in Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128 (3d Cir.
2002), we held that “because the AEDPA limitations period [28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)] is
subject to equitable modifications such as tolling, it is also subject to other non-
jurisdictional, equitable considerations, such as waiver.” Id. at 134.  Accordingly, we held
that the AEDPA’s limitations provision is an affirmative defense, which, just like any
other statute of limitations defense, will be waived if not timely raised by a state
5respondent to a habeas petition.
In Robinson, after concluding that a state respondent could waive the limitations
defense, we went on to consider at what point in a habeas proceeding the limitations
defense will be considered waived.  We noted that although Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c) requires that a defendant plead a statute of limitations defense in his or her
answer, the established rule of this Court also allows a statute of limitations defense to be
raised by motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “but only if ‘the time
alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought
within the statute of limitations.’” Id. at 135 (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veteran’s Admin.
Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975).  In accordance with these rules, we held that
“affirmative defenses under the AEDPA . . . if not pleaded in the answer . . . must be
raised at the earliest practicable moment thereafter.” Id. at 137.
In Robinson, the state respondents’ initial response to Robinson’s habeas petition
did not mention the statute of limitations defense, but instead argued that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because it was a successive petition filed
without authorization from this Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).  Only
after we found that Robinson’s petition was not a successive petition precluded by section
2244(b)(3) and remanded the petition to the District Court did the state respondents raise
the limitations defense in their answer.
Under these facts, we held that the state respondents had not waived the limitations
6defense.  We reasoned that the state respondents’ initial response to Robinson’s petition
was the equivalent of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(6), and, thus, the affirmative limitations defense need not then have been
raised.   Accordingly, the state respondents’ assertion of the limitations defense in their
first pleading after the petition was remanded was timely.
In light of our analysis and holdings in Robinson, of which the District Court did
not have the benefit when it dismissed the petition, it is clear that the District Court
should not have sua sponte dismissed the petition on the ground it was time-barred under
section 2244(d).  Unlike the state respondents in Robinson, respondents here never even
mentioned the limitations defense in any pleading and thereby waived the defense.  As we
held in Robinson, the AEDPA’s limitations defense, if not raised in the answer, “must be
raised at the earliest practicable moment thereafter.” Robinson, 313 F.3d at 137.  Here,
over six months passed between the filing of the answer to Stewart’s petition and the
District Court’s dismissal.  Clearly, the “earliest practicable moment” that respondents
could have raised the limitations issue had long since passed by the time the District
Court dismissed the petition.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument, citing cases decided by other
courts of appeals, that a district court may raise the AEDPA’s limitations provision sua
sponte, so long as the petitioner has notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Our holding in
Robinson that the limitations defense can be waived by a state respondent effectively
forecloses this argument.  Compare Robinson, 313 F.3d at 137, with Herbst v. Cook, 260
F.3d 1039, 1043(9th Cir. 2001) (district court may raise AEDPA limitations provision sua
sponte so long as petitioner is afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard), and Acosta
v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District Court dismissing
Stewart’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing opinion.
     /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry                           
Circuit Judge
